I show that ownership by blockholding and board composition is important determinants of corporate debt maturity structure. Using GMM methodology to control for the potential endogeneity of all regressors, I find a statistically and economically significant negative relation between short term debt and both blockholding and board structure irrespective of the identity of shareholders. Robustness tests provide support to the hypothesis that less diversified shareholders tend to trade-off underinvestment against the liquidity risk entailed in shorter maturities. Finally, I report strong evidence that the link with insider ownership is non-linear. JEL Classification: G32, G34
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Since Myers (1977) , capital structure studies have documented the importance of short-term debt in mitigating the underinvestment problem. However, debt maturing within a shorter horizon increases the risk of suboptimal liquidation and, thus, increases the expected bankruptcy costs (Diamond (1991); Johnson (2003) ). Therefore, in choosing their optimal debt maturity structure, firms would trade-off the benefits of lower underinvestment entailed by shorter maturities, against the cost of increasing liquidation risk. Datta et al. (2005) recently introduced a new layer to this debate, by relaxing the assumption of perfectly aligned managers.
1 They argue that short-term debt can be very costly for managers, first by virtue of their stronger degree of risk aversion (Denis (2001)), and second because it entails tighter monitoring (Hart and Moore (1995) ). Consequently, if insiders are not aligned to shareholders interests, they have a strong preference for long over short-term debt. Increasing insider ownership would then moderate manager shareholder conflicts and, thus, reduce the likelihood of firms choosing suboptimal longer maturity structures.
The first important, and as of yet unaddressed, issue in this work is to show that it is crucial to control for the equity positions of outside investors as well, in order to have a more complete understanding of debt maturity choices by firms. As ownership concentration increases, large investors stand to lose more in case of underinvestment. However, larger blockholders have greater incentives to monitor managers. This, in turn, can reduce equity agency conflicts and limit manager's preference for longer maturities. Consequently, a positive link between ownership concentration and the proportion of short term debt in the capital structure could be predicted, reflecting the reduced exposure to underinvestment.
Nevertheless, there is a trade-off between a high degree of monitoring, which is promoted by concentrated ownership, and risk-sharing gains, which requires more diffuse ownership (Admati et al. (1994) ). Ownership concentration can be very costly for holders of large block positions as the reduced portfolio diversification exposes them more to the liquidity risk. Therefore, they may be expected to prefer longer maturities. Overall, blockholders will push for a certain maturity structure of debt on the basis of this trade-off between the benefits of reduced underinvestment costs and the increased costs associated with liquidity risk. Based on theoretical arguments alone it is difficult to predict which of these aspects will dominate and it becomes an empirical issue which I explicitly test in this work.
A second important aspect I examine is how different shareholders influence corporate debt maturity structure. The literature on shareholder activism has focused on the role played by institutional investors given the rising size of their equity positions around the world.
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Institutional investors typically own more diversified portfolios than other non-financial investors (Denis (2001) ) and may have a different propensity to get involved in the decision making than non financial ones (i.e. Gorton and Kahl (1999) ; Hartzell and Starks (2003) ). In particular, the potential liquidity risk entailed in shorter maturities may have a relatively small effect on the total wealth of very well diversified shareholders possibly leading to a positive (or at most insignificant) relation between short-term debt and institutional ownership.
Differently from previous studies, I also evaluate the possibility that the link between insider ownership and debt maturity is non linear. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , managers are not fully aligned to shareholders' interests unless they own 100% of the shares;
however, as their shareholding increases, their discretion over the firm's resources increases as well (entrenchment effect). It is therefore important to explore whether there is a non-linear relation between managerial ownership and maturity decisions. Consequently, I include a quadratic term of managerial ownership in my models.
A further original aspect of my study is that I analyze the role of board composition.
Corporate governance practices have evolved considerably over the last fifteen years focusing much of the attention on the composition of board of directors. As Dahya and McConnell (2005) report, at least 18 countries have published codes of best corporate governance practice along the lines of the initial Cadbury code published in 1992. Following the UK example, these codes have strongly emphasized the importance of board composition. This has a direct bearing on the topic under analysis here as, through their monitoring of manager's actions, "better" boards of directors could steer capital structure decisions away from suboptimal levels. As this is the first test on this matter, I explore whether both the CEO/Chairman split and the proportion of non-executives on the board are negatively related to short-term debt, to the extent that different control mechanisms substitute each other to reduce the equity agency conflicts.
A great complication in this field arises from the fact that not only the ownership structure can affect the choice of a specific maturity of debt, but it can also be affected by it.
For instance, debt maturity is in itself a tool that can reduce agency conflicts (Stulz (2000)) and can potentially act as a substitute of ownership concentration, insider ownership and board composition. I adopt the Generalized Method of Moments technique to clearly identify the direction of causality between maturity and ownership and corporate governance characteristics, besides controlling for the endogeneity of all regressors (i.e. leverage) and the presence of unobservable fixed effects.
To investigate my hypotheses, I use an original, hand collected database of a large sample of UK non-financial listed firms between 1991 and 2001. Analysis of the UK system is important for a number of reasons. First, as I document here, UK companies rely on debt due within one year significantly more than their US counterparts, regardless their size. 3 This is critical in this context as debt maturing within one year has stronger implications in terms of liquidity risk. As Table I shows, for instance, the median total debt due within one year for small UK firms is 72%; the corresponding figure for the US is only about 3%. In addition, my calculations reveal that a staggering 30% of US listed firms do not have any debt maturing within one year.
Conversely, this only counts for 1% of the entire UK sample. 4 5 UK provides an ideal testing ground for Diamond (1991) theory on the relevance of the liquidity risk embedded in short maturities Therefore, this paper on the UK market can add to existing US studies that usually investigate longer maturities.
[ INSERT TABLE I HERE] Second, UK firms are subject to similar agency conflicts as their US counterparts, but, as underlined by Dahya and McConnell (2005) , the UK was a "first mover" in this quest for better corporate governance and for this reason provides a sort of natural experiment to test my hypotheses. Finally, as the LSE is becoming the largest stock market in the world (New York Times (2006)), study of UK firms is of growing importance.
I find strong evidence that the relation between short-term debt and blockholding is both statistically and economically significant. An increase of one standard deviation in blockholding reduces short-term debt by 6.5% of its mean. Turning to shareholders' identity, institutional and non-institutional owners have both a significant and negative impact on short-term debt, corroborating the view that less diversified shareholders prefer longer maturities, regardless of their categorization. These results suggest that the liquidity risk issue dominates the underinvestment one. Robustness tests performed on sub-samples of very high/low liquidity risk firms corroborate these findings. When expected liquidity risk costs are very high, then shareholders opt for lengthening the maturity of debt. Vice versa, when I isolate low liquidity risk companies, I find that not only large shareholders have a much lower economic impact in low volatility and small companies sub-samples than the one estimated for the entire sample, but their impact becomes positive for companies with low growth opportunities.
I find strong evidence of a U-shaped relation between short-term debt and managerial ownership in line with the alignment/entrenchment incentives associated with insider shareholding. Moreover, results provide strong evidence that the link between insider ownership and maturity of debt is endogenous. This is a focal outcome given that my results indicate a change in the sign of the estimated coefficients once endogeneity is kept into account. In addition, Finally, the findings in this paper extend our knowledge on the interrelation between different control mechanisms (e.g., Aggarwal and Knoeber (1996) ), by showing a substitution effect between short-term debt, on one hand, and ownership and governance characteristics, on the other.
In the following section I describe data and methodology. Section II contains the results; while Section III reports the robustness checks. Section IV concludes.
I. Data and Methodology

A. Data
In the initial stage, a sample of approximately 1,000 UK listed non-financial firms was randomly selected from Datastream constituent lists. As ownership and corporate governance information were not available in machine-readable form, they were hand-collected from the PriceWaterhouse Corporate Register (December issue) for the period 1991 -2001 (Marchica and Mura (2005 ; Mura (2007)). Economic and market data were downloaded from Datastream. Data on credit rating were kindly provided by Reuters.
To be able to follow companies over time from two different datasets, a huge effort was devoted into tracking all the name changes (and defunct companies) in the sample period.
This was mainly retrieved from the Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, which reports systematic information on name changes, entries removed from the companies section, companies in liquidation, and companies in receivership and in administration. Moreover, as a further check, the Companies House website was also used, which is the official UK government register of UK companies.
To run the empirical analysis, a number of steps were undertaken. First, the dataset was cleaned of outliers. The ownership part of the dataset was thoroughly inspected in several directions. For example, the total shares collected for each company should not sum to more than 100%. In cases where it did, cross-checks were performed with other issues of the Hemscott volumes (using either the September edition of the same year or the March edition of the following year) and/or with the Stock Exchange Official Yearbook, which also contains some ownership information. In cases where it proved impossible to find coherent information from the different sources of data, the observation was dropped from the sample.
I then checked for outliers in the economic variables. There is no fixed rule for dealing with this issue, so, as a general rule of thumb, data were trimmed to the 99% percentile. The trimmed data were then benchmarked with descriptive statistics reported in other papers, to ensure that the sample was representative of the population of non-financial firms in the market. After the issue of outliers had been addressed, I excluded firms in the public utilities because of the peculiarities in their operational and regulatory conditions. I also excluded all firm-years missing observations for any variable.
Finally, I retained all firms with at least five consecutive years of observations, in order to compute asymptotically efficient second order serial correlation tests for GMM estimations (Arellano and Bond (1991) ). After this screening, there remained an unbalanced panel of 656 firms with 5983 observations.
I have gone to considerable lengths to check for consistency in the data and, in particular, for attrition bias. Analysis of comparative descriptive statistics shows that the firms used in the empirical analysis are not systematically different from those excluded.
To test my hypotheses I adopt three alternative measures of blockholding: the proportion of shares held by all non-managerial shareholders with more than 5% of shares (Blockholding);
the Herfindahl Index for all non-managerial owners (Herfindahl Index); and, the proportion of shares held by the largest non-managerial shareholder with more than 5% of shares (Largest NonManagerial Ownership) . Unlike the US system, in the UK the disclosure threshold was lowered to 3% in 1990 (Companies Act 1985 . The decision to define Blockholding and Largest NonManagerial Ownership at 5% instead of 3% is based on the fact that the Companies Act 1985
empowers shareholders with at least 5% of shares to add any resolution to the AGM agenda. and the proportion of non-executives to the total number of directors (Ratio).
B. Methodology
To test my hypotheses I specify a partial adjustment model for debt maturity decisions.
Under imperfect capital markets, the influence of financing decisions on firm value may imply that firms have a long-run target financial structure that is determined by corporate and personal taxes, liquidity and bankruptcy costs, and agency-related costs. Taking this argument as a starting point, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) examine the issuance of short-term and longterm debt, by assuming the existence of a target debt maturity. In addition, Brick and Ravid (1991) demonstrate theoretically the existence of an optimal debt maturity structure in presence of interest rate uncertainty. However, market imperfections, such as transaction costs (e.g., a delay in the (re)negotiation process with external lenders), will lead firms not to conform completely to their target, but instead to follow a pattern of partial adjustment. Therefore, I estimate the following dynamic model: Using too many moment conditions reduces dramatically the power of the Sargan statistic to detect invalid instruments (Bowsher (2002) ). As a consequence, I use only one lagged level (t-2) for strongly endogenous variables and only two lagged levels (t-1 and t-2)
for weakly endogenous ones.
The dependent variable (MAT) is defined as the proportion of debt due within one year. Besides the ownership variables discussed in the previous section, equation (1) incorporates also a set of control variables derived from the maturity literature.
Following the contracting-cost theory (Myers (1977) ; Barnea et al. (1980) ), I include a proxy for growth opportunities, expecting a positive relation with short-term debt due to underinvestment problems. However, firms with high growth opportunities are also expected to suffer more from liquidity risk problems, and this may give them an incentive to borrow long term (Guedes and Opler (1996) ; Johnson (2003)). I define growth opportunities (Marketto-Book) as the ratio of market value of total assets (book value of total assets minus book value of total equity plus market value of total equity) to book value of total assets. Another implication of contracting-cost theory relates to firm size. Larger firms are less exposed to the agency costs of debt. Moreover, they have easier access to capital markets than smaller firms (Titman and Wessel (1988) ; Barclay and Smith (1995) ), and can guarantee long-term debt with substantial collateral. As a result, the relation between short-term debt and firm size is expected to be negative. Size (Size) is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices. 11 Myers (1977) also argues that debt repayments should be scheduled to match the decline in value of assets in place. Consequently, I expect a negative relation between short-term debt and asset maturity (Asset Maturity), defined as the ratio of total fixed assets (net total of land and buildings, plant and machinery, construction in progress and other fixed assets) to annual depreciation expense, in line with Guedes and Opler (1996) .
I also include leverage (Leverage), defined as the total amount of debt to total assets.
Following the liquidity risk theory (Diamond (1991)), highly-levered firms may lengthen debt maturity to reduce the liquidity risk embedded in short-term debt (Johnson (2003) ). Further, Diamond (1991) demonstrates that high credit quality firms are more able to borrow in the long-term capital markets. On average, firms with credit rating are more likely to be of high credit quality than unrated ones and thus more able to lengthen their debt maturity. I incorporate a proxy for credit rating (Rating), defined as a dummy equal to one if a company is rated and zero otherwise. I also include a measure of volatility as an additional proxy for credit risk in line with previous work (Johnson (2003) ; Datta et al. (2005) ). I expect firms with more volatile cash flow to be negatively related with short term debt. I define volatility (Volatility) as the standard deviation of the first differences of earnings before taxes and depreciation over the four years preceding the sample year, divided by average total assets for that period.
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Based on the signaling theory proposed by Flannery (1986) , I expect that high-quality firms will issue debt with shorter maturities, to signal their quality to the market. In line with Barclay and Smith (1995) , I include a proxy for quality (Quality) which is defined as the difference between the pre-tax profits in t+1 and the pre-tax profits in t divided by the pre-tax profits in t.
Finally, according to the conclusions of tax-based studies, I predict a positive relation between short-term debt and the effective tax rate (Kane et al. (1985) ) and a negative relation with term structure (Brick and Ravid (1985) ). Tax rate (Tax) is defined as total tax charge divided by pre-tax profits; while term structure measure (Term Structure) is approximated by the difference between the yields on 10-year government bonds and the three-month Treasury bills. However, a caveat is necessary here, as a simple correlation neglects the possibility that all these variables may be endogenously determined. This calls for a more accurate and detailed analysis that takes into account the endogeneity issue among all regressors, besides the influence of both firm and time specific effects.
II. Results
A. Summary Statistics
[ Estimating the same models above in a static framework leaves the results unchanged.
INSERT TABLE IV HERE]
B. Regression Results
However, findings in Table V show that the coefficient of the lagged maturity is positive and significantly different from zero. Therefore, the adjustment factor λ , given by 1 α − , which represents the ability of firms to adjust to their target maturity levels, is greater than 0.5, possibly providing evidence that the dynamic nature of equation (1) is not rejected. This is consistent with Ozkan (2000) and Antoniou et al. (2006) . Firms seem to adjust their short-term debt relatively quickly, in an attempt to reach their target debt maturity.
[
INSERT TABLE V HERE]
B.1. Blockholders and Their Identity
The evidence in Tables V and VI This strongly corroborates the hypothesis that blockholding plays a significant role in determining the maturity structure of debt and omitting it may cause severe bias in the estimations. Further, the negative estimated coefficient suggests that the liquidity risk effect tends to dominate the underinvestment effect. An additional corroborating argument lies on some robustness checks I performed using debt due within 5 years as longer maturities imply lower liquidity risk. To the extent that the liquidity risk effect dominates the underinvestment one, I was expecting a weaker (or even insignificant) impact of blockholding. Indeed, unreported tests lend support to this argument since, although still negative and significant, the economic impact of blockholding results more than halved.
Findings in Models 3 through 6 may also have some implications in terms of managers-shareholders conflicts and monitoring instruments. Indeed, the negative sign is consistent with the idea that the disciplinary pressure imposed on managers by outside owners acts as a substitute for the disciplinary role of short debt maturity (Hart and Moore (1995) ). This may also suggest that increased monitoring may reduce the efficacy of debt as a market-signaling device (Zechahauser and Pound (1990) Models 7 and 8 in Table VI provide further insight into the relation between debt maturity decisions and non-managerial shareholders. I do not find support for the hypothesis that different shareholders have different incentives to monitor and, therefore, a different impact on maturity decisions. Instead, the presence of individuals and/or non-financial corporations, both as a group (Non-Institutional Ownership) and as largest non-managerial owners (Largest Non-Institutional Ownership) , is inversely related to short-term debt. Non-financial shareholders are less diversified and, thus, more exposed to liquidity risk. They have a clear incentive to lengthen the maturity of debt. Nonetheless, the evidence I report also suggests that debt maturity and non-institutional shareholders are substitute monitoring instruments. Non-financial shareholders may benefit from monitoring managerial behavior in line with the argument by Admati et al. (1994) , and this may be a signal to the market of mitigated agency conflicts within the firm.
On the other hand, I do not detect a significant relation between institutional investors and debt maturity decisions when I consider institutional investors as a group (Institutional Ownership, Model 7). This may be interpreted as an evidence of free-riding problems among multiple investors. However, when I single out the investor with the largest stake among institutional shareholders (Largest Institutional Ownership, Model 8), the results show that its impact on maturity decisions is negative and significant. Looking at the descriptive analysis of ownership data in Panel A Table II , one possible justification for this result is that the largest institutional owner holds a significant stake in the company whereas, average individual ownership by institutions is low (Table II) . Although larger investors have the option of simply selling their holdings, the extent of the average holding is so large that the shares cannot be sold without negatively affecting the stock price. Therefore, the argument of a trade-off between underinvestment and liquidity risk by concentrated owners may apply to financial investors as well.
Moreover, this result could also suggest that in virtue of its substantial stake in the company even a large financial institution may provide lenders with a positive signal of some monitoring actions and intervention in the firm business activity. Consistent with this evidence, Gillan and Starks (2000) argue that in the US system the low annual turnover of shares of CalPERS (California Public Employee Retirement System) and the New York
Retirement funds implies that larger investors may have incentives to hold the shares and actively encourage managers to improve performance and increase shareholder value.
Furthermore, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) (2001)) and in improving the return on shareholders' equity (Short and Keasey (1999)). Alternatively, the evidence I report may support the efficient monitoring hypothesis of Pound (1988) who maintains that institutional investors can be more efficient monitors than other shareholders because of their greater expertise, especially in financial matters. Therefore, the negative impact on short-term debt may represent a substitution among control mechanisms. In line with this idea, Bathala et al.
(1994) and Crutchley et al. (1999) document that the monitoring role of institutional ownership is an alternative device to the disciplinary role of debt.
INSERT TABLE VI HERE]
B.2. Managerial Ownership
Model 3 in Table V shows that managerial ownership plays a significant role in determining the maturity structure of firms, in line with previous studies in this literature. This result also provides support to the hypothesis that alternative control mechanisms are substitutes. Increasing ownership makes managers more aligned and reduces the pressure by lenders for frequent monitoring actions through the roll-over of short-term debt.
To further explore the relation between maturity and managerial ownership, in Table VI I include a quadratic term. Generally, in all the estimated models, there is a significant U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and short-term debt, suggesting that managers tend to lengthen the maturity of debt as their ownership in the firm increases. This is indicative of an alignment effect, and is corroborated by the fact that this appears to coincide with blockholder's preference. However, high levels of insider ownership may result in entrenched managers, who can expropriate external investors. In order to reduce negative repercussions, such as lower market evaluation of the firm's stocks, managers may tend to issue more short-term debt to signal to the market that they are not resorting to expropriation. Alternatively, external investors in the market may increase the pressure for higher levels of short-term debt if there is a potential threat of non value-maximizing actions by entrenched managers. The estimated turning points of the quadratic relation are about 37% across all models in Table VI. 14 Data inspection reveals that a non-negligible 12% of companies feature executive ownership greater than 37%.
15
Results in Table VI shows that in the UK system shares by non-executives do not have any impact on firm value.
Overall, the evidence presented in this paper strongly supports the idea that including blockholding and board composition enhances our understanding of the determinants of debt maturity structure and the effects of liquidity risk on the maturity choice.
B.4. Control variables
I generally find that firms with higher growth opportunities (Market-to-Book) tend to have less short-term debt, consistent with the liquidity risk hypothesis; they tend to issue more Rating is not significant in any model, although its sign is in line with the prediction. This is probably due to fact that very few UK firms were rated by an external agency during the 90s (Table III) . Therefore, the dummy Rating has a large number of zeros and thus a reduced 
III. Robustness checks
A. Largest Shareholders and Liquidity Risk
One of the implications of Myers (1977) is that short-term debt maximizes firm value by reducing the underinvestment problem when managers act in shareholders' interests.
Previous results show that when shareholders have large equity positions in the company and, thus, have less diversified portfolios, they tend to trade-off underinvestment against increased liquidity risk issues by lengthening the maturity of debt. To further check the validity of these results, I perform a series of robustness tests here.
If the argument provided above is correct, I should find a stronger impact of blockholding in very high liquidity risk companies, rather than in others. In companies more exposed to suboptimal liquidation problems, large, undiversified shareholders may push for even less short-term debt to reduce liquidity risks. To investigate this hypothesis, I define several proxies for high-liquidity risk firms. In line with Diamond (1991), more leveraged companies are more exposed to liquidity risk. In addition, firms with large growth opportunities are likely to be harmed more in case of premature liquidation. Also, Johnson (2003) suggests that companies with more volatile cash flows are likely to experience more difficulties in repaying debt; while smaller firms are likely to be less diversified which implies higher expected liquidity risk and bankruptcy costs.
Therefore, I build three separate dummies that are equal to one when a company is in the top quartile of the distributions of leverage, market-to-book value and volatility and a further dummy equal to one when a company is in the bottom quartile of the distributions of size. Then, I interact these dummies with Largest Non-Managerial Ownership, which represents the most undiversified external blockholder, in four separate models. To the extent that the liquidity risk effect dominates, I expect the interaction dummy to have a negative and significant influence on short-term debt which, in turn, represents an overall stronger impact of blockholding on debt maturity.
Results are reported in Table VII. The direct impact of Largest Non-Managerial
Ownership is negative and significant as in previous regressions. Consistent with the liquidity risk hypothesis, the interaction terms are negative in most of the models and always jointly significant, as reported by the F-tests. In companies more exposed to liquidity risk problems the overall impact of largest shareholders is negative and in most cases even stronger than for the entire sample (Models 10 through 12). For instance, in firms with highly volatile profits (Model 11) an increase of one standard deviation in the largest equity position is expected to reduce short-term debt by around 8.6% of its mean. Similar figures pertain to Largest NonManagerial Ownership in small firms (Model 12). These findings support my previous evidence that the liquidity risk effect dominates the underinvestment.
From a monitoring point of view, the negative interaction terms seem to suggest that the controlling benefits provided by short-term debt are overshadowed by the expected high liquidity risk costs in this sub-sample of firms. A substitution relation between alternative monitoring instruments emerges from these results, as in the previous ones.
[ INSERT TABLE VII HERE] As a further robustness check, I replicate a similar analysis with the low liquidity risk companies. If the argument above holds, I would expect blockholding to have a lower impact on short-term debt decisions in those companies with low liquidity risk issues.
For "low liquidity risk" dummy, I use the lowest quartile of the distributions of leverage, market-to-book and volatility and the highest quartile for size. The results in Table VIII show that the interaction terms are positive and jointly significant, as reported by the F-tests. In companies less exposed to potential suboptimal liquidation problems, the impact of blockholding is milder.
For instance, in large firms one standard deviation increase of Largest Non-Managerial
Ownership may reduce short-term debt of about 4.3% against the 6.4% for the entire sample (Model 16). That is, large shareholders are more inclined to having more short-term debt in large firms.
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These results may also be interpreted from a monitoring point of view. In companies that are more exposed to managerial discretion issues, the liquidity risk costs may be outweighed by Interestingly, when I classify firms by the leverage distribution, results do not show any difference between the high and low group. In both cases the impact of large shareholder is positive and jointly significant.
[INSERT TABLE VIII HERE]
To sum up, all these results corroborate the argument that expected liquidity risk costs are a driving force for blockholding in choosing a particular maturity structure.
B. Debt Maturity and Creditors' Identity
As a final robustness test, I analyze the impact of creditors' identity. As Table IX shows, banks are the main lenders in the UK system. Around 58% (70) of the total debt in the average (median) company is provided by banks (Bank Debt). In terms of maturity, on average 35% of short-term debt consists of bank debt (STBK), while in the median firm this figure is about 25%. On the other hand, statistics for the identity of long-term debt lenders reveal that, in the average firm, bank debt accounts for 23% of long-term debt (LTBK), but for only 2% in the median firm. This suggests that most long-term debt consists of non-bank debt.
INSERT TABLE IX HERE]
On the basis of these figures, it could be argued that the results on short-term debt in this work may be driven by creditors' identity and, thus, may capture a bank effect rather than a maturity effect. As a robustness check, in Table X I estimate the base model (Model 6) using long-term debt (the ratio of debt due after one year to total debt, LGDEBT) as a dependent 
IV. Conclusions
This study investigates whether a link exists between corporate debt maturity and both ownership structure and board composition.
I find a significant relation between short-term debt and blockholding. An increase of one standard deviation in blockholding reduces short-term debt by 6.5% of its mean. This is in line with the hypothesis that large shareholders may prefer longer maturities in the trade-off between underinvestment and liquidity risk. When I analyze different types of shareholders, I find that institutional and non-institutional owners both have a significant and negative impact on shortterm debt. This supports the view that largest less diversified shareholders prefer longer maturities, regardless of their categorization.
These results extend Johnson's (2003) findings that the liquidity risk entailed in shorter maturities is crucial in determining the optimal debt maturity structure. With respect to blockholders incentives, the liquidity risk seems to dominate the underinvestment. When I isolate sub-samples of high and low liquidity risk firms, I find corroborating evidence to this hypothesis.
Large shareholders have a higher economic impact in high volatility and large companies subsamples than the one estimated for the entire sample, suggesting that, when expected liquidity risk costs are very high, shareholders opt for even less short-term debt. On the other hand, when the company faces lower liquidity risk, large shareholders have a lower influence on short maturities.
These results also extend Diamond (1991) and Datta et al. (2005) by showing how the incentives of blockholders as well as insiders affect the relation between debt maturity and liquidity risk. by showing a substitution relation between short-term debt, on one hand, and ownership and governance characteristics, on the other.
1 A previous work by Kim and Sorenson (1986) of all US public debt issues in the last 30 years have a maturity within five years; while their proceeds account for about 40% of the total debt publicly raised (Table 1 Panel A and B, respectively). 5 The reliance on bank debt may be a reason for the substantial use of short-term debt among UK companies, as documented in Table IX . However, the evidence in Section 3 reveals that my results are not sensitive when I control for the source of debt.
6 All tests were replicated with a 3% cut-off, and the results are virtually unchanged.
7 I also tried to separate the effect of bank ownership from all other financial institutions in unreported robustness checks. However, the estimates were always insignificant. This may be because my calculations reveal that the percentage of shares held by banks in the average UK firm is equal to 1.48% which is the lowest level held by financial institutions. Further, only 3% of firmyear observations show a bank as a largest owner; conversely, more than 44% of firm-year observations feature an institutional investor as largest owner.
9 Evidence of the dynamic determination of firms' debt maturity structure is provided by Ozkan (2000) and Antoniou et al. (2006) . 10 The Difference Sargan test approach works as follows: first only instruments dated t-2 (strong endogeneity) for all variables is used and the corresponding Sargan test is calculated. Then, an instrument dated t-1 (weak endogeneity) is added for each variable at once in a number of subsequent regressions and the corresponding Sargan tests are computed. The set of instruments specified under the strong endogeneity assumption is a subset of those specified under the weak endogeneity assumption. If S denotes the Sargan statistics under the strong endogeneity assumption in the initial regression and S` the Sargan statistics under the weak endogeneity assumption in each subsequent regression, the difference DS = S-S` tests the validity of the additional instrument in each regression and, thus, assesses the nature of the endogeneity for that particular regressor (Bond (2002)).
11 For robustness purposes, I also used alternative definitions for Size, that is, the logarithm of market value of equity (e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995) ) and the logarithm of net sales in 1991 prices (Johnson (2003) ). Results are virtually similar to what reported here.
12 As a robustness check, I calculated also the standard deviation of the first differences of earnings over the six years preceding the sample year, but results do not change significantly.
13 By construction, the process of taking first differences introduces serial correlation of order one.
14 For example, the inflexion point for the quadratic relation in Friend and Lang (1988) report similar effects for low and high levels of insider shareholding and Wansley et al. (1996) show comparable turning points (approximately 40%) to those in my tests. In line with previous studies on ownership and performance (e.g., Morck et al. (1988) ; Mura (2007)), a cubic term is also included in the regressions. Unreported results show that the cubic form does not appear to enhance the explanatory power of the model. 16 As suggested in Stohs and Mauer (1996) , I also ran the same regressions for all the specifications without controlling for leverage, but I obtained the same results reported here.
17 As a further robustness check, I excluded from the above estimations Leverage, Market-to-Book, Volatility and Size and substituted them with the corresponding dummies for low/high liquidity risk firms. Results on the interaction terms are similar to those reported here. Furthermore, I divided the sample into high and low liquidity risk companies according to the average value of the distribution for Leverage, Market-to-Book, Volatility and Size respectively, finding that Largest NonManagerial Ownership has no significantly different impact between high and low risk companies. Blockholding is the total percentage of shares held by all large non-managerial shareholders with more than 5% of shares; Largest Non-Managerial Ownership is equal to the percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder with more than 5% of shares; Institutional Ownership is the total percentage of shares held by investment companies, insurance companies and banks with more than 5% of shares; Non-Institutional Ownership represents the total percentage of shares held by non-financial corporations and individuals with more than 5% of shares; Largest Institutional Ownership is the percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is an institutional investor, insurance company or bank with more than 5% of shares; Largest Non-Institutional Ownership is equal to the percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is a non-financial company or an individual with more than 5% of shares; Executive Ownership represents the percentage of shares by executive directors; Float is the sum of the undisclosed shareholding, below the official threshold. Figures for these variables are calculated including also those companies where shareholders have less than 5% shares. This is the reason why some averages are below 5%. Non-Managerial Shareholders is the total number of external shareholders with more than 5% shares; Institutional Investors is the number of financial institutions with more than 5% shares; Non-Institutional Investors is the number of non-financial institutions, private individuals, other non-financial companies with more than 5% shares; Executive Directors is the total number of executive directors; Non-Executive Directors is the total number of non-executive directors; Ratio is the proportion of non-executive directors on total board; Split is a dummy equal to 1 if there is separation between CEO and Chairman (figures below represent the percentage of firms with Split =1). This table shows the sample economic characteristics for 656 firms over the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . MAT is the ratio of debt repayable within one year to total debt; Market-to-Book is equal to the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is defined as the book value of firm's assets plus the difference between the market value and the book value of equities; Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Asset Maturity is the ratio of total fixed assets to annual depreciation, where total fixed assets represent the net total of land and buildings, plant and machinery, construction in progress and other fixed assets; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Volatility is equal to earnings before taxes and depreciation over the four years preceding the sample year, divided by average assets for that period; Quality is the growth rate of earnings, defined as the difference between the pre-tax profits in t+1 and the pre-tax profits in t divided by the pre-tax profits in t; Tax is the total tax ratio, defined as total tax charge divided by pre-tax profits; Term Structure is defined as the difference between the yields on 10-years government bonds and the three-months Treasury bills; Blockholding is the total percentage of shares held by all large non-managerial shareholders with more than 5% of shares; Hefindahl Index is the sum of all squared equity positions by non-managerial shareholders; Largest Non-Managerial Ownership is equal to the percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder with more than 5% of shares; Institutional Ownership is the total percentage of shares held by investment companies, insurance companies and banks with more than 5% of shares; Non-Institutional Ownership represents the total percentage of shares held by non-financial corporations and individuals with more than 5% of shares; Largest Institutional Ownership is the percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is an institutional investor, insurance company or bank with more than 5% of shares; Largest Non-Institutional Ownership is equal to the percentage of shares by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is a non-financial company or an individual with more than 5% of shares; Executive Ownership represents the percentage of shares by executive directors; Ratio is the proportion of non-executive directors on total board; Rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a company is rated and zero otherwise; Split is a dummy equal to 1 if there is separation between CEO and Chairman and zero otherwise. [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . MAT is the ratio of debt repayable within one year to total debt; Blockholding is the sum of all large external shareholders with more than 5% of shares; Hefindahl Index is the sum of all squared equity positions by non-managerial shareholders; Largest Non-Managerial Ownership is the shares held by the largest non-managerial shareholder with at least 5% shares; Institutional Ownership is the sum of the shares held by institutional investors, insurance companies and banks with more than 5% shares; Non-Institutional Ownership is the sum of the shares held by corporations and individuals with more than 5% shares; Largest Institutional Ownership is the shares held by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is either an institutional investor or an insurance company or a bank with more than 5% shares; Largest Non-Institutional Ownership is the shares held by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is either a corporation or an individual with more than 5% shares; Executive Ownership is the percentage of shares held by executive directors; Executive Ownership 2 is the square of Executive Ownership; Split is a dummy equal to 1 if there is separation between CEO and Chairman and zero otherwise; Ratio is equal to the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors; Market-to-Book is equal to the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is defined as the book value of firm's assets plus the difference between the market value and the book value of equities; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a company is rated and zero otherwise. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
Table V OLS, WG and GMM Results
This table includes OLS, WG and GMM estimations for a sample of 656 firms between 1991 and 2001. The dependent variable is the ratio of debt repayable within one year to total debt (MAT); Blockholding is the sum of all large external shareholders with more than 5% of shares; Executive Ownership is the total share of ownership held by executive directors; Split is a dummy equal to 1 if there is separation between CEO and Chairman and zero otherwise; Ratio is equal to the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors; Market-to-Book is equal to the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is defined as the book value of firm's assets plus the difference between the market value and the book value of equities; Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Asset Maturity is the ratio of total fixed assets to annual depreciation, where total fixed assets represent the net total of land and buildings, plant and machinery, construction in progress and other fixed assets; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a company is rated and zero otherwise; Volatility is equal to the standard deviation of the first differences of earnings before taxes and depreciation over the four years preceding the sample year, divided by average assets for that period; Quality is the growth rate of earnings, defined as the difference between the pre-tax profits in t+1 and the pre-tax profits in t divided by the pre-tax profits in t; Tax is the total tax ratio, defined as total tax charge divided by pre-tax profits; Term Structure is defined as the difference between the yields on 10-years government bonds and the three-months Treasury bills. GMM model is in first differences with levels dated [t-2] 1991 and 2001 . The dependent variable is the ratio of debt repayable within one year to total debt (MAT); Blockholding is the sum of all large external shareholders with more than 5% of shares; Hefindahl Index is the sum of all squared equity positions by non-managerial shareholders; Largest Non-Managerial Ownership is the shares held by the largest non-managerial shareholder with at least 5% shares; Institutional Ownership is the sum of the shares held by institutional investors, insurance companies and banks with more than 5% shares; Non-Institutional Ownership is the sum of the shares held by corporations and individuals with more than 5% shares; Largest Institutional Ownership is the shares held by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is either an institutional investor or an insurance company or a bank with more than 5% shares; Largest Non-Institutional Ownership is the shares held by the first non-managerial shareholder when it is either a corporation or an individual with more than 5% shares; Executive Ownership is the percentage of shares held by executive directors; Executive Ownership 2 is the square of Executive Ownership; Split is a dummy equal to 1 if there is separation between CEO and Chairman and zero otherwise; Ratio is equal to the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors; Market-to-Book is equal to the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is defined as the book value of firm's assets plus the difference between the market value and the book value of equities; Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Asset Maturity is the ratio of total fixed assets to annual depreciation, where total fixed assets represent the net total of land and buildings, plant and machinery, construction in progress and other fixed assets; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a company is rated and zero otherwise; Volatility is equal to the standard deviation of the first differences of earnings before taxes and depreciation over the four years preceding the sample year, divided by average assets for that period; Quality is the growth rate of earnings, defined as the difference between the pre-tax profits in t+1 and the pre-tax profits in t divided by the pre-tax profits in t; Tax is the total tax ratio, defined as total tax charge divided by pre-tax profits; Term Structure is defined as the difference between the yields on 10-years government bonds and the three-months Treasury bills. GMM models are in first differences with levels dated [t-2] Non-Managerial Ownership is the shares held by the largest nonmanagerial shareholder with at least 5% shares; HLEV is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the top quartile of the Leverage distribution; HMTBV is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the top quartile of the market-to-book distribution; HVOL is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the top quartile of Volatility distribution; LSIZE is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the bottom quartile of SIZE distribution; Executive Ownership is the total share of ownership held by executive directors; Executive Ownership 2 is the square of Executive Ownership; Split is a dummy equal to 1 if there is separation between CEO and Chairman and zero otherwise; Ratio is equal to the proportion of non-executives to total number of directors; Market-to-Book is equal to the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is defined as the book value of firm's assets plus the difference between the market value and the book value of equities; Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Asset Maturity is the ratio of total fixed assets to annual depreciation, where total fixed assets represent the net total of land and buildings, plant and machinery, construction in progress and other fixed assets; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a company is rated and zero otherwise; Volatility is equal to the standard deviation of the first differences of earnings before taxes and depreciation over the four years preceding the sample year, divided by average assets for that period; Quality is the growth rate of earnings, defined as the difference between the pre-tax profits in t+1 and the pre-tax profits in t divided by the pre-tax profits in t; Tax is the total tax ratio, defined as total tax charge divided by pre-tax profits; Term Structure is defined as the difference between the yields on 10-years government bonds and the three-months Treasury bills. GMM models are in first differences with levels dated [t-2] 
Table VIII Low-Liquidity Risk Firms and Largest Non-Managerial Ownership
This table includes GMM estimations for Model 6 augmented by the interaction terms with Largest Non-Managerial Ownership. The sample consists of 656 firms between 1991 and 2001. The dependent variable is the ratio of debt repayable within one year to total debt (MAT); Largest Non-Managerial Ownership is the shares held by the largest nonmanagerial shareholder with at least 5% shares; LLEV is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the bottom quartile of the Leverage distribution; LMTBV is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the bottom quartile of the market-to-book distribution; LVOL is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the bottom quartile of Volatility distribution; HSIZE is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is in the top quartile of SIZE distribution; Executive Ownership is the total share of ownership held by executive directors; Executive Ownership 2 is the square of Executive Ownership; Split is a dummy equal to 1 if there is separation between CEO and Chairman and zero otherwise; Ratio is equal to the proportion of nonexecutives to total number of directors; Market-to-Book is equal to the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets, where market value of total assets is defined as the book value of firm's assets plus the difference between the market value and the book value of equities; Size is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets in 1991 prices; Asset Maturity is the ratio of total fixed assets to annual depreciation, where total fixed assets represent the net total of land and buildings, plant and machinery, construction in progress and other fixed assets; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Rating is a dummy equal to 1 if a company is rated and zero otherwise; Volatility is equal to the standard deviation of the first differences of earnings before taxes and depreciation over the four years preceding the sample year, divided by average assets for that period; Quality is the growth rate of earnings, defined as the difference between the pre-tax profits in t+1 and the pre-tax profits in t divided by the pre-tax profits in t; Tax is the total tax ratio, defined as total tax charge divided by pre-tax profits; Term Structure is defined as the difference between the yields on 10-years government bonds and the three-months Treasury bills. GMM models are in first differences with levels dated [t-2] of MAT, Leverage, and Size and [t-1, t-2] of all other regressors as instruments. In all models time dummies are included. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are used in the estimations. Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity; m1 and m2 test for first and second order autocorrelation in residuals; F-test is a test on the joint significance between Largest Non-Managerial Ownership and interaction terms; Tp is inflexion point for Executive Ownership. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
MAT
Table IX Descriptive Statistics for Bank Debt
This table shows the characteristics of bank debt for 656 firms over the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . STBK is defined as the ratio of bank debt repayable within one year to total debt repayable within one year; LTBK is the ratio of bank debt due in more than one year to total debt repayable in more than one year; Bank Debt is equal to the ratio of bank debt to total debt. LGDEBT (ratio of debt repayable after one year to total debt); in Model 18 the dependent variable is MAT (proportion of total debt repayable within one), and it is augmented by Bank Debt (ratio of total bank debt to total debt). All remaining variables are defined in Table VI . GMM is the model in the first differences with levels dated [t-2] of the dependent variable, Leverage, Bank Debt, and Size and [t-1, t-2] of all other regressors as instruments. Time dummies are included. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are used in the estimations. Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the null of instrument validity; m1 and m2 test for first and second order autocorrelation in residuals; Tp is inflexion point for the U-shaped relation of Executive Ownership. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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